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Weareverypleased that the explorations of the ethical issues
raised by our research practice (McCambridge et al. 2013a)
have stimulated such thoughtful and diverse responses. Al-
most all indicate concern that it may be wrong to accept
the moral hazards we are prepared to face, and we agree
there are many reasons to take very seriously these issues,
hence our attempts to do so. Most appear to accept that our
research practices are of low risk and not likely to cause
harm to participants, and the key issues center on informed
consent. It is interesting that there are such differences in the
particular concerns identified by the commentators, andwe
are struck by the breadth of their concerns.
Wang and Kitsis (2013) believe there should be an indi-
vidual study requirement to measure the impact of decep-
tion when it is used, while we see a need to develop a body
of research on this subject, though not necessarily in every
study. Brief interventions opportunistically grab a fewmin-
utes of people’s time, and our orientation is to stripping
down rather than beefing up the research process, for rea-
sons previously explained, though simple brief measures of
the type proposed are appealing.
Plunk and Grucza (2013), Sisti and colleagues (2013),
and similarly Wang and Kitsis (2013) take exception to our
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suggestion that debriefing may be morally problematic in
certain circumstances. We had not intended to develop an
argument about this here (we present data more fully else-
where), merely to suggest a possible extension of this ap-
proach, and we do believe this worth considering further.
We disagree with Plunk and Grucza that deception rather
than debriefing should be considered the cause of any con-
sequent harms. The latter requires the former, and given
that the harms caused are directly consequent on debrief-
ing, this procedure is unavoidably a component (i.e., not the
sole) cause of them. We worry most about possible dam-
age to public trust in science, a primary motivation of this
proposal.
Schwab (2013) is, of course, correct that lying is more
problematic than deception by omission, and telling lies
requires stronger justification than incomplete disclosure.
What we do not say, however, is designed to affect par-
ticipants in particular ways for which the word deception
seems appropriate, because the nature of the intent clearly
matters.
For legal as well as ethical reasons, Zuraw (2013) dis-
tinguishes between situations in which deception in or af-
ter a consent procedure is more acceptable than studying
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individuals who are unaware that they are being studied.
Although the latter is common in studies of health records,
for example, we have a specific methodological agenda,
namely, to evaluate the effects of research participation it-
self in biasing study outcomes. Eliminating or obscuring
awareness of being studied is necessary for this particular
enterprise if it is judged worth doing in the first place, and
we make no case for the wider extension of this practice,
as previously emphasizing the contextual specificity of our
decision making.
O’Neil (2013) similarly distinguishes the use of decep-
tion in inducing participation to improve external validity
or generalizability from methods that deceive participants
to safeguard internal validity. We appreciate this distinc-
tion and are strongly influenced by the work of Donald
Campbell, the original author of it (Campbell 1957) who
overtime also extended thinking about it in more complex
formulations (see, e.g., Cook and Campbell 1979). There is
a widespread tendency in the research literature to think
of internal and external validity as mutually exclusive, but
they are related. In a behavioral intervention trial, the inter-
vention effect estimate is influenced by study sample com-
position; excluding those with severe problems can lead to
larger effect estimates because inference is restricted to a
more healthy reference population (Humphreys 2000). The
least biased estimate is the one from which to make infer-
ences about the true effects in the population of interest.
Internal and external validity are thus two sides of the same
coin.
O’Neil and Zuraw argue that AMADEUS-1 (McCam-
bridge et al. 2012) presents the most challenging ethical
issues in ways that are clearer to us now than before. We
acknowledge that increasing participation forms part of the
rationale for this design specifically to avoid erecting arti-
factual barriers to intervention access as conventional trial
designs do in this situation. There are also other method-
ological and substantive intervention effectiveness reasons
to avoid bias. We agree it is important that the justification
for studying people without consent be very clearly estab-
lished. In AMADEUS-1 there was an explicit attempt to
design out research participation effects prior to follow-up
data collection to permit unbiased quantification of inter-
vention effects. There was almost no difference in outcomes
between the two groups recruited at baseline, giving fur-
ther substance to our preexisting concerns that the small
individual-level effects and their components were vulner-
able to being biased by the research process, which moti-
vated the study design in the first place (McCambridge et al.
2013b). Small effects widely obtained at an individual level
are nevertheless important at a population level (Rose 1992).
In AMADEUS-1, participants were unaware they were
being studiedwhen they accessed routine practice or amod-
ified version of it. Participants volunteered to take part in a
cross-sectional survey, for follow-up purposes, missing the
explicit focus on alcohol (a decision for which there was a
strong methodological justification, based on experimental
data; Bendtsen et al. 2012). We cannot know whether those
who accessed the intervention and did not later participate
in the survey would have chosen to do so if they were of-
fered that choice. This group were responding to an e-mail
from the student health care service encouraging them to
think about drinking, an invitation they accepted.
AMADEUS-1 was aimed at enhancing effectiveness of
routine service provision. We cannot tell whether the com-
mentators would be less concerned by this context, but we
are. The deception involved in many ways may be simi-
lar to other health services research in which routine data
or service developments are evaluated. We do not mean to
suggest that this removes themoral dilemmas, just that they
are less unusual than theymight first seem.We also wonder
whether not having a formal consent procedure is really so
different to offering one in which, to use Schwab’s term, we
would be lying as extensively about the nature of the study
as occurred in the other two studies (Kypri et al. 2010; Kypri
et al. 2011).
Not doing research that involves taking ethical risks to
better understand the nature of the problems caused by
alcohol and how to intervene with this behavior should
not be an ethically comfortable position. Hendershot and
colleagues (2013) identify important historical advances in
understanding in this field as they eloquently articulate a
range of benefits that flow from constraining individual
autonomy for population health benefit. There is also a con-
temporary need that can be concisely stated less dryly than
we did in the original article: Alcohol kills approximately
5 million people every year, and these numbers are grow-
ing rapidly (Lim et al. 2012), as the alcohol industry targets
emerging economies in low andmiddle income countries in
ways which will drive new epidemics of death and disease,
if allowed to continue (Casswell 2013). Think of the awful
tragedies of Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and all the othermajor
wars of the early 21st century; alcohol kills more than all of
them combined. Just like these wars, alcohol ruins child-
hoods and kills young adults in ways that tobacco does not,
as well as slowly accumulating health problems over the
life course with sustained heavy drinking and dependence.
We know so little about this behavior and about how
people can be helped to avoid the death and disease it
causes. This is partly because our research investigations
are so clumsy that conventional practice in behavioral in-
tervention trials in public health interferes with what we
are trying to study, in ways we do not understand clearly
(McCambridge in press). If careful use of deception helps
to advance understanding of this behaviour and how peo-
ple may be helped to change for themselves, surely there
is a moral imperative to use this knowledge to prevent or
ameliorate avoidable suffering on such a scale.
We know well the challenges involved in trying to ad-
dress this particular set of corporate induced diseases (Ba-
bor and Robaina 2013; Jahiel 2008), and helping people to
manage their lives inways that protect them from the effects
of other health-compromising activities and commodities is
central tomuch of public health today (Childress et al. 2002).
The overall impact of the commentaries has been to deepen
our appreciation of the moral complexities of these issues,
shaping our ongoing considerations of them but without
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having dramatically altered our thinking. In part, this re-
flects a distinction between our perspective and that ofmost
of the commentators, and that is what should be the proper
unit or frame of analysis of ethical issues. Do the rights and
welfare of individual research participants take precedence
over the needs of populations to benefit from this research?
Pragmatism involves trying to balance both (Brendel and
Miller 2008), an approach that clearly involves taking eth-
ical risks with the rights of research participants here that
need to be carefully considered, which seems particularly
appropriate for public health (Buchanan and Miller 2006).
Nonetheless, the core purpose of this research is to do so in
ways that deliver benefits to populations or society. Greater
attention to authorizing deception or proxy consent at the
population rather than the individual level is an attractive
possibility.
The metaphor of the tip of an iceberg of unknown size
being visible above the waterline seems appropriate for
evaluating the use of deception in research. Our research
community decided long ago that it was acceptable to in-
terfere with informed consent to do the types of studies we
now do online. We worry about what might happen to our
participants as a result of our actions, for which we accept
responsibility. Our efforts to be vigilant toward issues they
raise generate few concerns, though this does not mean that
we are right. We are taking new steps probably using more
deception than our colleagues have done in the past and are
humbled when we consider how little we know compared
to howmuchwe need to know about alcohol, public health,
and human behavior more generally. Our determination to
gain understanding in these studies and to apply what we
find has, we believe, a strong moral foundation. The need
for public health research ethics guidance seemed clear to
us before and following this process of publication and re-
view remains so, and where the commentators discuss this
issue, they also agree. This is a long-term project and one
that should not be restricted to professional ethicists or re-
searchers alone. 
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